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Abstract
In order to generate synthetic basket data sets for better benchmark test-
ing, it is important to integrate characteristics from real-life databases into
the synthetic basket data sets. The characteristics that could be used for this
purpose include the frequent itemsets and association rules. The problem of
generating synthetic basket data sets from frequent itemsets is generally re-
ferred to as inverse frequent itemset mining. In this paper, we show that the
problem of approximate inverse frequent itemset mining is NP-complete.
Then we propose and analyze an approximate algorithm for approximate in-
verse frequent itemset mining, and discuss privacy issues related to the syn-
thetic basket data set. In particular, we propose an approximate algorithm to
determine the privacy leakage in a synthetic basket data set.
∗An extended abstract of this paper has appeared in [35].
Keywords: data mining, privacy, complexity, inverse frequent itemset
mining
1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper [2], association rule and frequent itemset mining received
a lot of attention. By comparing five well-known association rule algorithms (i.e.,
Apriori [3], Charm [38], FP-growth [14], Closet [22], and MagnumOpus [33])
using three real-world data sets and the artificial data set from IBM Almaden,
Zheng et al. [39] found out that the algorithm performance on the artificial data
sets are very different from their performance on real-world data sets. Thus there
is a great need to use real-world data sets as benchmarks.
However, organizations usually hesitate to provide their real-world data sets
as benchmarks due to the potential disclosure of private information. There have
been two different approaches to this problem. The first is to disturb the data be-
fore delivery for mining so that real values are obscured while preserving statistics
on the collection. Some recent work [5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, 29, 30] investigates the
tradeoff between private information leakage and accuracy of mining results. One
problem related to the perturbation based approach is that it can not always fully
preserve individual’s privacy while achieving precision of mining results.
The second approach to address this problem is to generate synthetic basket
data sets for benchmarking purpose by integrating characteristics from real-world
basket data sets that may have influence on the software performance. The fre-
quent sets and their supports (defined as the number of transactions in the basket
data set that contain the items) can be considered to be a reasonable summary of
the real-world data set. As observed by Calders [7], association rules for basket
data set can be described by frequent itemsets. Thus it is sufficient to consider fre-
quent itemsets only. Ramesh et al. [27] recently investigated the relation between
the distribution of discovered frequent set and the performance of association rule
mining. It suggests that the performance of association rule mining method us-
ing the original data set should be very similar to that using the synthetic one
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compatible with the same frequent set mining results.
Informally speaking, in this approach, one first mines frequent itemsets and
their corresponding supports from the real-world basket data sets. These fre-
quent itemset support constraints are used to generate the synthetic (mock) data
set which could be used for benchmarking. For this approach, private information
should be deleted from the frequent itemset support constraints or from the mock
database. The authors of [7, 20] investigate the problem whether there exists a
data set that is consistent with the given frequent itemsets and frequencies and
show that this problem is NP-complete. The frequency of each frequent itemset
can be taken as a constraint over the original data set. The problem of inverse
frequent set mining then can be translated to a linear constraint problem. Linear
programming problems can be commonly solved today in hundreds or thousands
of variables and constraints. However, the number of variables and constraints in
this scenario is far beyond hundreds or thousands (e.g., 2t, where t is the number
of items). Hence it is impractical to apply linear programming techniques directly.
Recently, the authors of [36] investigated a heuristic method to generate synthetic
basket data set using the frequent sets and their supports mined from the origi-
nal basket data set. Instead of applying linear programming directly on all the
items, it applies graph-theoretical results to decompose items into independent
components and then apply linear programming on each component. One poten-
tial problem here is that the number of items contained in some components may
be still too large (especially when items are highly correlated each other), which
makes the application of linear programming infeasible.
The authors of [27, 28] proposed a method to generate basket data set for
benchmarking when the length distributions of frequent and maximal frequent
itemset collections are available. Though the generated synthetic data set pre-
serves the length distributions of frequent patterns, one serious limitation is that
the size of transaction databases generated is much larger than that of original
database while the number of items generated is much smaller. We believe the
sizes of items and transactions are two important parameters as they may signifi-
cantly affect the performance of association rule mining algorithms.
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Instead of using the exact inverse frequent itemset mining approach, we pro-
pose an approach to construct transaction databases which have the same size as
the original transaction database and which are approximately consistent with the
given frequent itemset constraints. These approximate transaction databases are
sufficient for benchmarking purpose. In this paper, we consider the complexity
problem, the approximation problem, and privacy issues for this approach.
We first introduce some terminologies. I is the finite set of items. A trans-
action over I is defined as a pair (tid, I) where I is a subset of I and tid is a
natural number, called the transaction identifier. A transaction database D over
I is a finite set of transactions over I. For an item set I ⊆ I and a transaction
(tid, J), we say that (tid, J) contains I if I ⊆ J . The support of an itemset I in
a transaction database D over I is defined as the number of transactions T in D
that contains I , and is denoted support(I,D). The frequency of an itemset I in a
transaction database D over I is defined as
freq(I,D) =def
support(I,D)
|D|
.
Calders [6, 7] defined the following problems that are related to the inverse fre-
quent itemset mining.
FREQSAT
Instance: An item set I and a sequence (I1, f1), (I2, f2), · · ·, (Im, fm), where
Ii ⊆ I are itemsets and 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1 are nonnegative rational numbers, for all
0 ≤ i ≤ m.
Question: Does there exist a transaction databaseD over I such that freq(Ii,D) =
fi for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m?
FFREQSAT (Fixed size FREQSAT)
Instance: An integer n, an item set I, and a sequence (I1, f1), (I2, f2), · · ·,
(Im, fm), where Ii ⊆ I are itemsets and 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1 are nonnegative rational
numbers, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m.
Question: Does there exist a transaction database D over I such that D contains
n transactions and freq(Ii,D) = fi for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m?
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FSUPPSAT
Instance: An integer n, an item set I, and a sequence (I1, s1), (I2, s2), · · ·,
(Im, sm), where Ii ⊆ I are itemsets and si ≥ 0 are nonnegative integers, for
all 0 ≤ i ≤ m.
Question: Does there exist a transaction database D over I such that D contains
n transactions and support(Ii,D) = si for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m?
Obviously, the problem FSUPPSAT is equivalent to the problem FFREQSAT.
Calders [6] showed that FREQSAT is NP-complete and the problem FSUPPSAT
is equivalent to the Intersection Pattern problem IP: given an n×n matrix C with
integer entries, do there exist sets S1, . . . , Sn such that |Si∩Sj | = C[i, j]? Though
it is known that IP is NP-hard, it is an open problem whether IP belongs to NP.
In this paper, we will consider the problem of generating transaction databases
that approximately satisfy the given frequent itemset support constraints. Section
2 discusses the computational complexity of approximating transaction databases.
Section 3 proposes an algorithm to approximately generate a approximate trans-
action database. Section 4 discusses privacy issues and Section 5. Finally, Section
6 draws conclusions.
2 Approximations
Though it is an interesting problem to study whether there exists a size n transac-
tion database that satisfies a set of given frequency constraints, it is sufficient for
benchmarking purpose to construct a transaction database that is approximately
at the size of n and that approximately satisfies the set of given frequency con-
straints. Thus we define the following problem.
ApproSUPPSAT
Instance: An integer n, an item set I, and a sequence (I1, s1), (I2, s2), · · ·,
(Im, sm), where Ii ⊆ I are itemsets and si ≥ 0 are nonnegative integers, for
all 0 ≤ i ≤ m.
Question: Does there exist a transaction database D of n′ transactions over I such
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that |n− n′| = O(m) and |support(Ii,D)− si| = O(m) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m?
Note that in the above definition, the approximation errors are based on the
parameter m instead of n since for most applications, m is small and n is big-
ger. Indeed, n could be at the exponential order of m. For performance test-
ing purpose, it is not meaningful to use n as the parameter in these situations.
It also straightforward to show that the problem ApproSUPPSAT is equivalent
to the following problem: given an integer n, an item set I, and a sequence
(I1, s1), (I2, s2), · · · , (Im, sm), decide whether there exists a transaction database
D over I with n transactions and 0 ≤ support(Ii,D) − si = O(m) for all
0 ≤ i ≤ m.
In the following we show that ApproSUPPSAT is NP-complete. Note that
for the non-approximate version FSUPPSAT of this problem, we do not know
whether it is in NP.
Lemma 2.1 ApproSUPPSAT ∈ NP.
Proof. Since the size of the transaction database is n which might be exponential
in the size of the instance input description, it is not possible to guess a transaction
database in polynomial time and check whether it satisfies the constraints. In the
following, we use other techniques to show that the problem is in NP. Let I be
the collection of item sets and (I1, s1), (I2, s2), · · ·, (Im, sm) be the sequence of
support constraints. Assume that |I| = t. Let J0, J1, · · · , J2t−1 be an enumeration
of the 2t subsets of I (in particular, let J0 = ∅ and J2t−1 = I), and X0, X1, . . .,
X2t−1 be 2t variables corresponding to these itemsets.
Assume that a transaction database D with n′ = n + O(m) transactions con-
tains Xi itemset Ji for each 0 ≤ i ≤ 2t and D approximately satisfies the support
constraints (I1, s1), (I2, s2), · · ·, (Im, sm). Then there exists an integer k such that
the following equations (1) hold for some integer values X0, . . . , X2t−1, Z0, . . .,
Zm. Similarly, if there is an integer k and an integer solution to the equations
(1), then there is a transaction database D with n′ = n + O(m) transactions that
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approximately satisfies the support constraints (I1, s1), . . ., (Im, sm).
X1, . . . , X2t ≥ 0
|Z0|, |Z1|, . . . , |Zm| ≤ km∑2t
i=0Xi + Z0 = n∑
I1⊆Ji
Xi + Z1 = s1
· · ·∑
Im⊆Ji
Xi + Zm = sm
(1)
where k is a large enough integer. In another word, if the given instance of the
ApproSUPPSAT problem is satisfiable, then the equations (1) have an integer so-
lution. That is, the solution space for the equation (1) is a non-empty convex poly-
hedron. A simple argument1 could then be used to show that there is an extreme
point (X01 , . . . , X02t) (not necessarily an integer point) on this convex polyhedron
that satisfies the following property:
• There are at most m+ 1 non-zero values among the variables X01 , . . ., X02t ,
Z0, . . ., Zm.
Let Yi = [X0i ] be the closest integer to X0i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2t and DY be the transac-
tion database that contains Yi copies of the itemset Ji for each 0 ≤ i ≤ 2t. Then
DY contains n + O(m) transactions and |support(Ii,D) − si| = O(m) for all
0 ≤ i ≤ m.
In another word, the given instance of the ApproSUPPSAT problem is sat-
isfiable if and only if there exist itemsets J1, . . . , Jm+1 and an integer sequence
x1, . . . , xm+1 such that the transaction database D consisting of xi copies of item-
set Ji for each i ≤ m witnesses the satisfiability. Thus ApproSUPPSAT ∈ NP
which completes the proof of Lemma. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.2 ApproSUPPSAT is NP-hard.
1Similar argument has been used to prove the fundamental theorem of linear optimization in
linear programming. See, e.g., [12, 24].
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Proof. The proof is based on an amplification of the reduction in the NP-hardness
proof for FREQSAT in [6] which is alike the one given for 2SAT in [13]. In the
following, we reduce the NP-complete problem 3-colorability to ApproSUPPSAT.
Given a graph G = (V,E), G is 3-colorable if there exists a 3-coloring function
c : V → {R,G,B} such that for each edge (u, v) in E we have c(u) 6= c(v).
For the graph G = (V,E), we construct an instanceA(G) of ApproSUPPSAT
as follows. Let m = 6|V | + 3|E|, and n = k0m2 for some large k0 (note that
we need k0 > k for the constant k we will discuss later). Let the itemset I =
{Rv, Gv, Bv : v ∈ B} and the m support constraints are defined as follows. For
each vertex v ∈ V :
support({Rv}) = [
n
3
], support({Gv}) = [
n
3
],
support({Bv}) = [
n
3
],
support({Rv, Gv}) = 0, support({Rv, Bv}) = 0,
support({Gv, Bv}) = 0.
For each edge (u, v) ∈ E:
support({Ru, Rv}) = 0, support({Gu, Gv}) = 0,
support({Bu, Bv}) = 0.
In the following, we show that there is a transaction database D satisfying this
ApproSUPPSAT problem if and only if G is 3-colorable.
Suppose that c is a 3-coloring of G. Let T be a transaction defined by letting
T1 = {Cv : v ∈ V } where
Cv =def


Rv if c(v) = R;
Gv if c(v) = G;
Bv if c(v) = B.
Let transactions T2 and T3 be defined by colorings c′ and c′′ resulting from cycli-
cally rearranging the colors R,G,B in the coloring c. Let the transaction database
D consist of [n
3
] copies of each of the transaction T1, T2, and T3 (we may need to
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add one or two additional copies of T1 if 3[n3 ] 6= n). Then D satisfies the Appro-
SUPPSAT problem A(G).
Suppose D is a transaction database satisfying the ApproSUPPSAT problem
A(G). We will show that there is a transaction T in D from which a 3-coloring of
G could be constructed. Let I1 be the collection of itemsets defined as
I1 = {{Rv, Gv}, {Rv, Bv}, {Gv, Bv} : v ∈ V }∪
{{Ru, Rv}, {Gu, Gv}, {Bu, Bv} : (u, v) ∈ E}.
That is, I1 is the collection of itemset that should have 0 support according to the
support constraints. Since D satisfies A(G), for each I ′ ∈ I1, support(I ′,D) = 0
is approximately satisfied. Thus there is a constant k1 > 0 such that at most k1m×
|I1| = 3k1m(|V | + |E|) transactions in D contain an itemset in I1. Let D1 be
the transaction database obtained from D by deleting all transactions that contain
itemsets from I1. Then D1 contains at least n− 3k1m(|V |+ |E|) transactions.
For each vertex v ∈ V , we say that a transaction (tid, J) in D does not contain
v if J does not contain any items from {Rv, Gv, Bv}. Since D satisfies A(G),
for each v ∈ V , approximately one third of the transactions contain Rv (Gv, Bv,
respectively). Thus there is a constant k2 > 0 such that at most 3k2m × |V |
transactions in D do not contain some vertex v ∈ V . In another word, there are at
least n− 3k2m× |V | transactions J in D such that J contains v for all v ∈ V .
Let D2 be the transaction database obtained from D1 by deleting all transac-
tions J such that J does not contain some vertex v ∈ V . The above analysis
shows that D2 contains at least n− 3k1m(|V |+ |E|)− 3k2m|V | transactions. Let
k = max{k1, k2}. Then we have
|D2| ≥ n− 3km(|V |+ |E|)− 3km|V |
= n− km(6|V |+ 3|E|)
= n− km2
= 3 · k0m
2 − km2
By the assumption of k0 at the beginning of this proof, we have |D2| ≥ 1. For any
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transaction J in D2, we can define a coloring c for G by letting
c(v) =


R if J contains Rv
G if J contains Gv
B if J contains Bv
By the definition of D2, the coloring c is defined unambiguously. That is, G is
3-colorable.
This completes the proof for NP-hardness of ApproSUPPSAT. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2.3 ApproSUPPSAT is NP-complete.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2. Q.E.D.
We showed that the problem ApproSUPPSAT is NP-hard. In the proof of
Lemma 2.2, we use the fact that the number n of transactions of the target basket
database is larger than the multiplication of the number m of support constraints
and the approximate error O(m) (that is, n is in the order of O(m2)). In practice,
the number n may not be larger than km2. Then one may wonder whether the
problem is still NP-complete. If n is very small, for example, at the order ofO(m),
then obviously, the problem ApproSUPPSAT becomes trivial since one can just
construct the transaction database as the collection of n copies of the itemset I
(that is, the entire set of items). This is not a very interesting case since if n is at
the order ofm, one certainly does not want the approximate error to be at the order
of n also. A reasonable problem could be that one defines a constant number γ to
replace the approximate error O(m). Then the proof in Lemma 2.2 shows that the
problem ApproSUPPSAT with approximate error γ (instead of O(m)) is still NP-
complete if n > γm. Tighter bounds could be achieved if weighted approximate
errors for different support constraints are given.
3 Generating approximate transaction databases
In this section, we design and analyze a linear program based algorithm to ap-
proximate the NP-complete problem ApproSUPPSAT. Let I = {e1, . . . , et} be
10
the collection of items, n be the number of transactions in the desired database
D, and (I1, s1), (I2, s2), · · ·, (Im, sm) be the sequence of support constraints. Ac-
cording to the proof of Lemma 2.1, if this instance of ApproSUPPSAT is solv-
able, then there is a transaction database D, consisting of at most m + 1 itemsets
J1, . . . , Jm+1, that satisfies these constraints. Let X1, . . . , Xm+1 be variables rep-
resenting the numbers of duplicated copies of these itemsets in D respectively.
That is, D contains Xi copies of Ji for each i. For all i ≤ m and j ≤ m + 1, let
xi,j and yi,j be variables with the property that xi,j = Xj × yi,j and
yi,j =

 1 if Ii ⊆ Jj,0 otherwise. (2)
Then we have support(Ii,D) = xi,1 + · · ·+ xi,m+1 and the above given Appro-
SUPPSAT instance could be formulated as the following question.
minimize z1 + z2 + · · ·+ zm (3)
subject to 

X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xm+1 = n,
si + zi = xi,1 + · · ·+ xi,m+1,
yi,j = 1 if Ii ⊆ Jj and yi,j = 0 otherwise,
xi,j = Xj × yi,j,
zi, Xj are nonnegative integers,
(4)
for i ≤ m and j ≤ m+ 1.
The condition set (4) contains the nonlinear equation xi,j = Xj × yi,j and
the nonlinear condition specified in (2). Thus in order to approximate the given
ApproSUPPSAT instance using linear program techniques, we need to convert
these conditions to linear conditions.
We first use characteristic arrays of variables to denote the unknown itemsets
J1, . . . , Jm+1. For any itemset I ⊆ I, let the t-ary array χ(I) ∈ {0, 1}t be the
characteristic array of I . That is, the i-th component χ(I)[i] = 1 if and only
if ei ∈ I . Let χ(J1) = (u1,1, . . . , u1,t), . . ., χ(Jm+1) = (um+1,1, . . . , um+1,t)
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be a collection of (m + 1)t variables taking values from {0, 1}, representing the
characteristic arrays of J1, . . . , Jm+1 respectively.
In order to convert the condition specified in (2) to linear conditions. we first
use inner product constraints to represent the condition Ii ⊆ Jj . For two charac-
teristic arrays χ1 and χ2, their inner product is defined as χ1 · χ2 = χ1[1] · χ2[1] +
· · ·+ χ1[t] · χ2[t]. It is straightforward to show that for two itemsets I, J ⊆ I, we
have χ(I) · χ(J) ≤ min{|I|, |J |} and χ(I) · χ(J) = |I| if and only if I ⊆ J .
Now the following conditions in (5) will guarantee that the condition in (2) is
satisfied. 

|Ii| · yi,j ≤ χ(Jj) · χ(Ii) ≤ yi,j + |Ii| − 1
yi,j, uj,k ∈ {0, 1}
(5)
for all i ≤ m, j ≤ m + 1, and k ≤ t. The geometric interpretation of this
condition is as follows. If we consider (χ(Jj) · χ(Ii), yi,j) as a point in the 2-
dimensional space (x, y) shown in Figure 1, then |Ii|y ≤ x defines points below
the line passing the points (0, 0) and (|Ii|, 1), and x ≤ y + |Ii| − 1 defines the
points above the line passing through the points (|Ii| − 1, 0) and (|Ii|, 1). Thus
yi,j = 1 if and only if χ(Jj) · χ(Ii) = |Ii|. That is, yi,j = 1 if and only if Ii ⊆ Jj .
y
x
(0,0)
(|Ii|,1)
(|Ii|−1,0)
Figure 1: Triangle
The nonlinear equations xi,j = Xj × yi,j can be converted to the following
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conditions consisting of inequalities.


xi,j − nyi,j ≤ 0,
Xj ≥ xi,j ,
nyi,j +Xj − xi,j ≤ n,
xi,j ≥ 0,
yi,j ∈ {0, 1},
(6)
for all i ≤ m and j ≤ m+ 1. The constant n is used in the inequalities due to the
fact that Xj ≤ n for all j ≤ m + 1. The geometric interpretation for the above
inequalities is described in the following. If we consider (xi,j, yi,j, Xj) as a point
in a 3-dimensional space (x, y,X) shown in Figure 2, then
1. x− ny = 0 defines the plane passing through points (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, n), and
(n, 1, n); Thus xi,j − nyi,j ≤ 0 guarantees that xi,j = 0 if yi,j = 0.
2. X ≥ x defines the points above the plane passing through points (0, 0, 0),
(0, 1, 0), and (n, 1, n). This condition together with the condition yi,j ∈
{0, 1} guarantees that xi,j ≤ Xj when yi,j = 1.
3. ny +X − x ≤ n defines the points below the plane passing through points
(0, 1, 0), (0, 0, n), and (n, 1, n). This condition together with the condition
yi,j ∈ {0, 1} guarantees that xi,j ≥ Xj when yi,j = 1. Together with the
condition 2, we have xi,j = Xj when yi,j = 1.
Note: For the reason of convenience, we introduced the intermediate variables
yi,j. In order to improve the linear program performance, we may combine the
conditions (5) and (6) to cancel the variables yi,j .
Thus the integer programming formulation for the given ApproSUPPSAT in-
stance is as follows.
minimize z1 + z2 + · · ·+ zm (7)
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(0, 0, 0)
(n, 1, n)
(0, 0, n)
x
y
X
(0,1,0)
Figure 2: Tetrahedron
subject to conditions (5), (6), and


X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xm+1 = n,
si + zi = xi,1 + · · ·+ xi,m+1,
zi, Xj are nonnegative integers,
(8)
for i ≤ m and j ≤ m + 1. We first solve the linear relaxation of this integer
program. That is, replace the second equation in the condition (5) by
0 ≤ yi,j, uj,k ≤ 1 for all i ≤ m, j ≤ m+ 1, and k ≤ t
and replace the third equation in the condition (8) by
zi, Xj ≥ 0.
Let o∗ = {(u∗j,k, y∗i,j, x∗i,j, z∗i , X∗j ) : i ≤ m, j ≤ m + 1, k ≤ t} denote an optimal
solution to this relaxed linear program. There are several ways to construct an
integer solution o¯ from o∗. Let OPT (z; I) denote the optimal value of z1 + · · ·+
zm for a given ApproSUPPSAT instance I and OPT (z; I) be the corresponding
value for the computed integer solution. For an approximation algorithm, one may
prefer to compute a number α such that
OPT (z; I) ≤ αOPT (z; I).
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Theorem 2.3 shows that it is NP-hard to approximate the ApproSUPPSAT by an
additive polynomial factor. Thus OPT (z; I) is not in the order of O(m) in the
worst case for any polynomial time approximation algorithms, and it is not very
interesting to analyze the worst case for our algorithm.
In the following, we first discuss two simple naive rounding methods to get
an integer solution o¯ from o∗. We then present two improved randomized and
derandomized rounding methods.
Method 1: rounding u∗j,k
Construct an integer solution o¯ = (u¯j,k, y¯i,j, x¯i,j, z¯i, X¯j) by rounding u∗j,k to their
closest integers, rounding X∗j to their almost closest integers so that X¯1 + · · · +
X¯m+1 = n, and computing y¯i,j, x¯i,j , and z¯i according to their definitions. That is,
for each j ≤ m+ 1 and k ≤ t set
u¯j,k =

 1 if u
∗
j,k ≥ 0.5,
0 otherwise.
For the rounding of X∗j , first round X∗j to their closest integers [X∗j ]. Then ran-
domly add/subtract 1’s to/from these values according to the value of X¯1 + · · ·+
X¯m+1 − n until X¯1 + · · ·+ X¯m+1 = n.
From the construction, it is clear that o¯ is a feasible solution of the integer pro-
gram. The rounding procedure will introduce the following errors to the optimal
solution:
1. By rounding {u∗j,k : i ≤ m, k ≤ t}, the values in {χ(Ii) ·χ(Jj) : i ≤ m, j ≤
m+ 1} change. Thus the values in {y¯i,j : i ≤ m, j ≤ m+ 1} will change.
Thus the values in {x¯i,j : i ≤ m, j ≤ m + 1} will be different from the
values in {x∗i,j : i ≤ m, j ≤ m+ 1}.
2. By rounding {X∗j : j ≤ m + 1}, the values of {x¯i,j : i ≤ m, j ≤ m + 1}
will change also.
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Method 2: rounding x∗i,j
Construct an integer solution o¯ = (u¯j,k, y¯i,j, x¯i,j , z¯i, X¯j) by rounding x∗i,j to 0 or
X∗j and computing the other values according to their definitions or relationships.
That is, first round X∗j to their closest integers [X∗j ]. Then randomly add/subtract
1’s to/from these values according to the value of X¯1 + · · · + X¯m+1 − n until
X¯1 + · · ·+ X¯m+1 = n. Now round x∗i,j as follows. Let
x¯i,j =

 X¯j if x
∗
i,j ≥ 0.5X¯j,
0 otherwise.
Jj’s could be computed by setting
Jj = ∪x¯i,j=X¯jIi.
The values of u¯j,k and y¯i,j can be derived from Jj easily. We still need to further
update the values of x¯i,j by using the current values of y¯i,j since we need to satisfy
the requirements xi,j = Xj × yi,j.
From the construction, it is clear that o¯ is a feasible solution of the integer pro-
gram. The rounding procedure will introduce the following errors to the optimal
solution:
1. By rounding {x∗i,j : i ≤ m, j ≤ m + 1}, we need to update the values of
y¯i,j, which again leads to the update of values of x¯i,j .
2. By rounding {X∗j : j ≤ m + 1}, the values in {x¯i,j : i ≤ m, j ≤ m + 1}
will change also.
Method 3: randomized and derandomized rounding
For quite a few NP-hard problems that are reduced to integer programs, naive
round methods remain to be the ones with best known performance guarantee.
Our methods 1 and 2 are based on these naive rounding ideas. In last decades,
randomization and derandomization methods (see, e.g., [31, 25]) have received a
great deal of attention in algorithm design. In this paradigm for algorithm design,
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a randomized algorithm is first designed, then the algorithm is “derandomized”
by simulating the role of the randomization in critical places in the algorithm. In
this section, we will design a randomized and derandomized rounding approach to
obtain an integer solution o¯ from o∗ with performance of at least the expectation.
It is done by the method of conditional probabilities.
In rounding method 1, we round u∗j,k to its closest integer. In a random round-
ing [26], we set the value of u¯j,k to 1 with probability u∗j,k and to 0 with probability
1− u∗j,k (independent of other indices).
In rounding method 2, we round x∗i,j to the closest value among 0 and X¯j . In
a random rounding [26], we set the value of x¯i,j to X¯j with probability x
∗
i,j
X¯j
and to
0 with probability 1− x
∗
i,j
X¯j
(independent of other indices).
A random rounding approach produces integer solutions with an expected
value z0 for
∑m
i=1 zi. An improved rounding approach (derandomized rounding)
produces integer solutions with ∑mi=1 zi guaranteed to be no larger than the ex-
pected value z0. In the following, we illustrate our method for the random round-
ing based on the rounding methods 1 and 2.
Randomized and derandomized rounding of x∗i,j . We determine the value of
an additional variable in each step. Suppose that {x¯i,j : (i, j) ∈ I0} has already
been determined, and we want to determine the value of x¯i0,j0 with (i0, j0) /∈ I0.
We compute the conditional expectation for∑mi=1 zi of this partial assignment first
with x¯i0,j0 set to zero, and then again with it set to X¯j0 . If we set x¯i0,j0 according
to which of these values is smaller, then the conditional expectation at the end of
this step is at most the conditional expectation at the end of the previous step. This
implies that at the end of the rounding, we get at most the original expectation.
In the following, we show how to compute the conditional expectation. At
the beginning of each step, assume that for all entries (i′, j′) in I0, x¯i′,j′ has been
determined already and we want to determine the value of x¯i0,j0 for (i0, j0) /∈ I0
in this step.
In order to compute the conditional expectation of ∑mi=1 zi, we first compute
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the probability Prob[Ii ⊆ Jj] for all (i, j) /∈ I0. For each j ≤ m+ 1, let
J0j =
⋃
Ii′⊆Jj ,(i
′,j)∈I0
Ii′
If Ii ⊆ J0j , then we have Ii ⊂ Jj and Prob[Ii ⊆ Jj ] = 1. Otherwise, continue with
the following computation. By regarding x
∗
i,j
X¯j
as the probability that x∗i,j takes the
value X¯j , we know that with at least probability
x∗
i,j
X¯j
we have Ii ⊆ Jj . However,
the actual probability may be larger since other entries Ii′ with Ii ∩ Ii′ 6= ∅ may
contribute items to Jj , which may lead to the inclusion of Ii in Jj . First we define
the following sets.
Li,j = {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . .m} \ {i
′ : (i′, j) ∈ I0}
Ui,j =

K ⊆ Li,j : Ii ⊆ J0j ⋃
⋃
i′∈K
Ii′

 ,
and
U ′i,j = {K ∈ Ui,j : there is no K ′ ∈ Ui,j such that K ′ ⊂ K}.
For each K ∈ U ′i,j , let
p(i, j,K) =
∏
i′∈K
x∗i′,j
X¯j
.
Then the probability Prob[Ii ⊆ Jj] can be approximated as
Prob[Ii ⊆ Jj] =
x∗i,j
X¯j
+
(
1−
x∗i,j
X¯j
) ∑
K∈U ′
i,j
p(i, j,K).
Note that we say that we approximate the probability Prob[Ii ⊆ Jj ] since in the
computation, we assume that Prob[Ii′ ⊆ Jj ] =
x∗
i′,j
X¯j
for other i′ which may not be
true. If necessary, we can improve the approximation by iteration. That is, repeat
the above procedure for several rounds and, in each round, use the approximated
probabilities for Prob[Ii′ ⊆ Jj ] from the previous round. If sufficient rounds are
repeated, the probability will converge in the end.
Since we have the probabilities Prob[Ii ⊆ Jj ] for all (i, j) /∈ I0 now, it is
straightforward to compute the conditional expectation ofE(∑mi=1 zi) = ∑mi=1E(zi).
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The expected value for zi is
E(zi) = E

m+1∑
j=1
xi,j

− si = m+1∑
j=1
X¯j · Prob[Ii ⊆ Jj]− si.
Randomized and derandomized rounding of u∗j,k. We determine the value of
an additional variable in each step. Suppose that {u¯j,k : (j, k) ∈ I0} has already
been determined, and we want to determine the value of u¯j0,k0 with (j0, k0) /∈ I0.
We compute the conditional expectation for∑mi=1 zi of this partial assignment first
with u¯i0,j0 set to zero, and then again with it set to 1. If we set u¯j0,k0 according to
which of these values is smaller, then the conditional expectation at the end of this
step is at most the conditional expectation at the end of the previous step. This
implies that at the end of the rounding, we get at most the original expectation.
According to our analysis in the randomized and derandomized rounding of
x∗i,j , it is sufficient to compute the probability Prob[Ii ⊆ Jj ] for all (i, j). Assume
I = {e1, . . . , et} and Ii = {ei1 , . . ., ei|Ii|}. Set
Prob[Ii ⊆ Jj ] = uˆj,i1 × · · · × uˆj,i|Ii|
where
uˆj,is =

 u¯j,is if (j, is) ∈ I0,u∗j,is otherwise
for s ≤ |Ii|. Using Prob[Ii ⊆ Jj], one can compute the conditional expectation of∑m
i=1 zi as in the case for rounding of x∗i,j .
Complexity analysis of the approximation algorithm
In the integer linear program formulation of our problem, we have t(m+ 1) vari-
ables uj,k, m+1 variables Xj , m(m+1) variables xi,j , m(m+1) variables yi,j ,
and m variables zi. In total, we have t(m+ 1) + 2m2 + 4m+ 1 variables.
There are (m + 1)(2m + t) constraints in the condition (5), 4m(m + 1) con-
straints in the condition (5), and 3m+ 2 constraints in the condition (8). Thus we
have 6m2 + 9m+mt + t+ 2 constraints in total.
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The rounding, randomized, and derandomized rounding algorithms could be
finished in O(tm3) steps. Thus the major challenge is to solve the relaxed con-
tinuous variables linear program. According to [19], hundreds of thousands of
continuous variables are regularly solved. Thus our approximation algorithm are
efficient when m and t takes reasonable values.
4 Privacy issues
Wang, Wu, and Zheng [34] considered general information disclosure in the pro-
cess of mock database generation. In this section, we discuss privacy disclo-
sures in synthetic transaction databases. Confidential information in transaction
databases may be specified as a collection of itemsets and their corresponding
support (frequency) intervals. Let P be a set defined as follows.
P = {(Ii, si, Si) : Ii ⊆ I, i ≤ l}.
We say that a (synthetic) transaction database D does not disclose confidential
information specified in P if one cannot infer that
si ≤ support(Ii;D) ≤ Si
for all (Ii, si, Si) ∈ P . Similarly, we say that a support constraint set S =
{(I ′1, s1), . . . , (I
′
m, sm)} does not disclose confidential information specified in P
if for each element (Ii, si, Si) ∈ P , there is a transaction database Di that satisfies
all support constraints in S and
support(Ii,Di) /∈ [si, Si].
For the synthetic transaction database generation, there are two scenarios for
potential private information disclosure. In the first scenario, the database owner
uses the following procedure to generate the synthetic transaction database:
1. use a software package to mine the real-world transaction database to get a
set of itemset support (frequency) constraints;
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2. use a software package based on our linear program methods to generate a
synthetic transaction database D from the support (frequency) constraints;
3. release the synthetic transaction database D to the public.
In this scenario, the mined support (frequency) constraints are not released to
the public and only the synthetic transaction database is released. In this case,
it is straightforward to protect the confidential information specified in P . The
database owner proceeds according to the above steps until step 3. Before releas-
ing the synthetic transaction databaseD, he can delete the confidential information
as follows.
• For each (Ii, si, Si) ∈ P , chooses a random number ri ≤ n, where n is the
total number of transactions. We distinguish the following two cases:
1. If ui = support(Ii,D)− ri < 0, then chooses a random series of −ui
transactions tj that do not contain the itemset Ii, and modify these
transactions to contain the itemset Ii.
2. If ui = support(Ii,D) − ri ≥ 0, then chooses a random series of ui
transactions tj that contain the itemset Ii, and modify these transac-
tions in a random way so that they do not contain the itemset Ii.
After the above process, the resulting transaction database contains no confidential
information specified in P and the database owner is ready to release it.
In the second scenario, the database owner uses the following procedure to
generate the synthetic transaction database:
1. use a software package to mine the real-world transaction database to get a
set of itemset support (frequency) constraints;
2. release the support (frequency) constraints to the public;
3. a customer who has interest in a synthetic transaction database generates
a synthetic transaction database D from the published support (frequency)
constraints using a software package based on our linear program methods.
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In this scenario, the mined support (frequency) constraints are released to the
public directly. Thus the database owner wants to make sure that no confidential
information specified in P is contained in these support (frequency) constraints.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a single element (I, s, S) in
P and the mined support constraints are S = {(Ii, si) : i ≤ m}. S contains the
confidential information (I, s, S) if and only if for each transaction database D
which is consistent with S, we have support(I;D) ∈ [s, S]. In another word, S
does not contain the confidential information (I, s, S) if and only if there exists
an integer s′ with s′ < s or S < s′ < n such that S ∪ {(I, s′)} is consistent.
That is, there is a transaction database D that satisfies all support constraints in
S ∪ {(I, s′)}. In the following, we show that there is even no efficient way to
approximately decide whether a given support constraint set contains confidential
information. We first define the problem formally.
ApproPrivacy
Instance: An integer n, an item set I, a support constraint set S = {(I ′1, s′1), · · ·,
(I ′m, s
′
m)}, and a set P = {(Ii, si, Si) : Ii ⊆ I, i ≤ l}.
Question: For all transaction databaseD of n transactions over I with |support(I ′i,D)−
s′i| = O(m) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m, do we have support(Ii,D) ∈ [si, Si] for all i ≤ l?
If the answer is yes, we write S |=a P .
By Theorem 2.3, we have the following result. Similar NP-hardness results
for exact frequency constraints inference have been obtained in [6, 7, 20].
Theorem 4.1 ApproPrivacy is coNP-complete.
Proof. S 6|=a P if and only if there is a transaction database D and an in-
dex j ≤ l such that D satisfies S ∪ {(Ij , support(Ij,D) < si)} or D satisfies
S ∪ {(Ij, support(Ij,D) > Si)} approximately. Thus the theorem follows from
Theorem 2.3. Q.E.D.
Thus there is no efficient way for the database owner to decide whether a sup-
port constraint set S leaks confidential information specified in P . In practice,
however, we can use the linear program based approximation algorithms that we
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have discussed in Section 3 to compute the confidence level about private infor-
mation leakage as follows.
1. Convert the condition S ∪ {(I, s′) : s′ < s or S < s′ ≤ n} to an integer
linear program in the format of (8). Note that the condition “s′ < s or S <
s′ ≤ n” is equivalent to the existential clause ∃s′ ((s′ < s) ∨ (S < s′ ≤ n)).
Thus it is straightforward to convert it to integer linear program conditions.
2. Let the confidence level be c = ∑mi=1 zi. The smaller c, the higher con-
fidence. In the ideal case of c = 0, we have found an itemset transac-
tion database D that witnesses that no confidential information specified by
(I, s, S) is leaked in S.
If the database owner thinks that the confidence value c = ∑mi=1 zi obtained in the
above procedure is too larger (thus confidence level is too low). He may use the
following procedure to delete potential confidential information from the support
constraint set.
1. Let i be the number that maximizes max(Ii,si)∈S |I ∩ Ii|.
2. Modify the value si to be a random value.
3. Approximately revise support constraint values in S to make it consistent.
For example, to make it satisfy the monotonic rule. Since it is NP-hard to
determine whether a support constraint set is consistent, we can only revise
the set S to be approximately consistent.
It should be noted that after the above process, the resulting support constraint
set may become inconsistent. Thus in the next round, the value c = ∑mi=1 zi
may be larger. If that happens, the larger value c does not interpret as the privacy
confidence level. Instead, it should be interpreted as an indicator for inconsistency
of the support constraint set. Thus the above privacy deletion procedure should
only be carried out one time.
We should note that even if the confidence level is higher, (that is, c = ∑mi=1 zi
is small), there is still possibility that the confidential information specified by
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(I, s, S) is leaked in theory. That is, for each transaction database D that satisfies
the constraints S, we have support(I,D) ∈ [s, S]. However, no one may be able
to recover this information since it is NP-hard to infer this fact. Support constraint
inference has been extensively studied by Calders in [6, 7].
It would be interesting to consider conditional privacy-preserving synthetic
transaction database generations. That is, we say that no private information is
leaked unless some hardness problems are solved efficiently. This is similar to the
methodologies that are used in public key cryptography. For example, we believe
that RSA encryption scheme is secure unless one can factorize large integers.
In our case, we may assume that it is hard on average to efficiently solve
integer linear programs. Based on this assumption, we can say that unless integer
linear programs could be solved efficiently on average, no privacy specified in P
is leaked by S if the computed confidence level c = ∑mi=1 zi is small.
5 Related Work
Privacy preserving data mining has been a very active research topic in the last
few years. There are two general approaches mainly from privacy preserving
data mining framework: data perturbation and the distributed secure multi-party
computation approach. As the context of this paper focuses on data perturbation
for single site, we will not discuss the multi-party computation based approach for
distributed cases (See [23] for a recent survey).
Agrawal and Srikant, in [4], first proposed the development of data mining
techniques that incorporate privacy concerns and illustrated a perturbation based
approach for decision tree learning. Agrawal and Agrawal, in [1], have provided
a expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm for reconstructing the distribution of
the original data from perturbed observations. They provide information theo-
retic measures to quantify the amount of privacy provided by a randomization
approach. Recently, Huang et al. in [15], investigated how correlations among
attributes affect the privacy of a data set disguised via the random perturbation
scheme and proposed methods (PCA based and MLE based) to reconstruct orig-
24
inal data. The objective of all randomized based privacy-preserving data mining
[1, 4, 11, 18, 29] is to prevent the disclosure of confidential individual values while
preserving general patterns and rules. The idea of these randomization based ap-
proaches is that the distorted data, together with the distribution of the random
data used to distort the data, can be used to generate an approximation to the orig-
inal data values while the distorted data does not reveal private information, and
thus is safe to use for mining. Although privacy preserving data mining consid-
ers seriously how much information can be inferred or computed from large data
made available through data mining algorithms and looks for ways to minimize
the leakage of information, however, the problem how to quantify and evaluate
the tradeoffs between data mining accuracy and privacy is still open [10].
In the context of privacy preserving association rule mining, there have also
been a lot of active researches. In [5, 8], the authors considered the problem of
limiting disclosure of sensitive rules, aiming at selectively hiding some frequent
itemsets from large databases with as little impact on other, non-sensitive frequent
itemsets as possible. The idea was to modify a given database so that the support
of a given set of sensitive rules decreases below the minimum support value. Sim-
ilarly, the authors in [30] presented a method for selectively replacing individual
values with unknowns from a database to prevent the discovery of a set of rules,
while minimizing the side effects on non-sensitive rules. The authors studied the
impact of hiding strategies in the original data set by quantifying how much in-
formation is preserved after sanitizing a data set [21]. The authors, in [11, 29],
studied the problem of mining association rules from transactions in which the
data has been randomized to preserve privacy of individual transactions. One
problem is it may introduce some false association rules. The authors, in [17, 32],
investigated distributed privacy preserving association rule mining. Though this
approach can fully preserve privacy, it works only for distributed environment and
needs sophisticated protocols (secure multi-party computation based [37]), which
makes it infeasible for our scenario.
Wu et al. have proposed a general framework for privacy preserving database
application testing by generating synthetic data sets based on some a-priori knowl-
25
edge about the production databases [34]. The general a-priori knowledge such as
statistics and rules can also be taken as constraints of the underlying data records.
The problem investigated in this paper can be thought as a simplified problem
where data set here is binary one and constraints are frequencies of given frequent
itemsets. However, the techniques developed in [34] are infeasible here as the
number of items are much larger than the number of attributes in general data
sets.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we discussed the general problems regarding privacy preserving syn-
thetic transaction database generation for benchmark testing purpose. In particu-
lar, we showed that this problem is generally NP-hard. Approximation algorithms
for both synthetic transaction database generation and privacy leakage confidence
level approximation have been proposed. These approximation algorithms include
solving a continuous variable linear program. According to [19], linear problems
having hundreds of thousands of continuous variables are regularly solved. Thus
if the support constraint set size is in the order of hundreds of thousands, then
these approximation algorithms are efficient on regular Pentium-based comput-
ers. If more constraints are necessary, then more powerful computers are needed
to generate synthetic transaction databases.
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